The chariot metaphor and Philo’s Stoic spiritual journey

Returning to Philo’s employment of the chariot metaphor, finally, we see how he integrated it into a wider vision of the soul’s journey to wholeness that is significantly shaped by a Stoic outlook. The journey of the soul was a major theme throughout his corpus, and on a couple of occasions he related this journey to the chariot metaphor.[1] We will quote a passage from Philo’s De Migratione Abrahami that nicely summarizes most of the important elements of his discussion and supplement it with passages from Legum Allegoriarum where he discusses it in much greater detail:

“Upon your breast and your belly you shall go” (Genesis 3.14), in the literal sense applies to the serpent, but is really a truly Divine oracle applying to every irrational (ἄλογος) and passion-loving (φιλοπαθής) man; for the breast is the abode of fierce spirit (θυμός), and desire (ἐπιθυμία) dwells in the belly. The fool’s (ὁ ἄφρων) whole course through every moment of his journey depends on this pair, fierce spirit and desire; since he has got rid (ἀποβαλών) of mind (νοῦς), who is the charioteer and monitor. The man of the opposite character (ὁ ἐναντίος τούτῳ) has exscinded (ἐκτέτμηται) fierce spirit and desire, and chosen as his patron and controlling guide the Divine Word (λόγον θεῖον). Even so Moses, best beloved of God, when offering the whole burnt sacrifices of the soul, will “wash out the belly” (Lev. 8.1), that is, will cleanse away desire in every shape (ὅλον τὸ ἐπιθυμίας εἶδος ἐκνίψεται), but “the breast from the ram of consecration he will take away (ἀφαιρέω)” (Lev. 8.29). This means, we may be sure, the warlife spirit in its completeness; and the object of taking it away is that the better portion of the soul, the rational part (τό λογικόν), that is left, may exercise its truly free and noble impulses (ὁρμαί) towards all things beautiful, with nothing pulling against it (ἀντισπάω) any longer and dragging it in another direction (μεθέλκω).[2]

In this passage, Philo set into opposition two types of souls in the strongest of terms. He introduces the passage by discussing the ‘fool’, then turned to a man of ‘opposite character’, namely Moses. On the one hand, the fool possesses fierce spirit and desire, but he has got rid of the mind. On the other hand, Moses exercises the rational part only, but has exscinded fierce anger and washed out every desire. It is as if the fool’s chariot is comprised of only the horses without a charioteer, while Moses’ chariot consists of the charioteer, but no horses. The implications are clear, the fool is utterly irrational, since he has gotten rid of the mind, while the Moses-soul is utterly rational and free from all passion, since he has cut off and cleansed anger and desire. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Philo described the fool as ‘an irrational and passion-loving man’, while he portrayed Moses as a passion-hater inasmuch as he has cut out and removed both passions.

Additionally, the two opposing types of souls follow different leaders. The fool aimlessly goes wherever fierce anger and desire lead since he has got rid of his charioteer and monitor. There is no overarching direction or meaning to his life, except for the fulfillment of the next desire, whatever it may be. The Divine Word, the source of all rationality in the cosmos, in contrast, leads Moses like a pilot of a ship. As such, his impulses are oriented only toward beautiful things (πρὸς τὰ καλὰ πάντα). Consequently, the character of their impulses contrast as well. Since the fool is carried about by anger and desire, his impulses as passions are by definition excessive and irratic. In contrast, Moses, having removed both passions, exercises only impulses that are always noble and free. Given that his impulses are under the guidance of the Divine Word, Philo’s ascription of nobility to Moses’ impulses implies a certain moderation, orderliness, and propriety in their movements. Both impulses are oriented in different directions.

The notion of treating people of diverse kinds of character as different soul types, in this case the fool verses Moses, wasn’t new with Philo. As noted earlier, Plato had already done this in the Republic where he sought to outline a five-part typology for individual souls that mirrored the five kinds of city-states in the community, namely the aristocratic or kingly, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical.[3] Each of the five soul-types reflected differing configurations of rule among Plato’s three parts of the soul. The tyrannical soul, for instance, is dominated by the appetitive part of the soul, while the kingly is properly ruled by the rational mind. While we might initially think that Philo’s description of the fool and the Moses-soul corresponds to Plato’s highest and lowest kinds of character, namely the tyrannical and kingly, the fit is poor. Unlike Plato, Philo did not conceive of the fool and Moses-soul as consisting of all three parts of the soul, but in alternative arrangements. Instead, he removes one or more parts of the soul altogether for each of the soul-types. Whereas Plato’s tyrannical soul subordinates rational and spirited part to the appetitive, Philo removes the mind, leaving the spirited and appetitive parts to mindlessly direct the soul coordinately. Alternatively, while Plato arranged the parts of the kingly soul in ideal order of first rational, second spirited, and finally appetitive, Philo’s Moses-soul consists of only the rational part. The spirited and appetitive parts have been cut off and washed away respectively. Additionally, the overall scheme for soul types differs for each author. While Plato certainly could set the kingly and tyrannical soul-types in opposition to one another on occasion, his wider aim in the Republic was to show a progression from the kingly soul-type to the tyrannical, evenly distributed among five classes. Philo, conversely, sets the fool and Moses-soul in sharp contrast to one another. He did, put forward a third kind of soul-type that exists between the two, with which the chariot metaphor best corresponds, as we will see later. Nevertheless, the overall thrust of his discussion of soul types differs from Plato’s. The emphasis in the text above and elsewhere is on the juxtaposition of the two, not as in Plato, the progression from one side of the spectrum to the other.

Philo instead opted for the Stoic scheme. As we have already noted in Philo’s text above, the Stoics had likewise juxtaposed two classes of souls, namely, the fool (ὁ φαυ̂λος) and the sage or wise man (ὁ σοφός).[4] They often expressed this juxtaposition in terms of the so-called ‘Stoic paradoxes’, vis-à-vis sayings like ‘only the sage possesses knowledge, everyone else is a fool’, or ‘only the sage is good, all others are evil’, etc. These paradoxes underscore the basic difference between the Stoic and Platonic mind-sets regarding the moral and spiritual life of the soul. Whereas Plato’s ideal for the kingly and tyrannical soul type might approach the Stoic portrait of sage and fool in some ways, though with important differences, the Stoics posed a strict and absolute dichotomy between the two. Rather than present the distinction between the two kinds of soul as a gradual metamorphosis from in the kingly soul type—for all human souls once dwelt with the gods prior to embodiment for Plato—to its return via philosophy, the Stoics instead positioned the sage and fool right next to one another in their ethical system. One is either a fool or a sage. There is no third option that is neither a fool nor a sage or a mix of the two. Even when the later Stoics did recognize a third soul type, namely, those who are progressing toward perfect wisdom, these were still technically categorized among the vicious. The Stoics were fond of pointing out that for a man submerged under the water, it makes no difference whether he is two inches or two miles below the surface, he is still downing in either case. Plato, by contrast, envisioned three intermediate stages between the kingly and tyrannical—the timocratic, oligarchic, and democratic soul types—that not only represented genuine stages of evolution or devolution from the kingly to the tyrannical and vice versa, but also a mixing of the two. When we survey Philo’s soul type scheme, we find that he too adopted the Stoic approach to the soul, taking over not only the basic Stoic framework, but also their more uncompromising characterization of the fool and sage.

On one side of his scheme for the soul, Philo placed the fool. He employed a wide assortment of terms to describe those classed as a fool, including the following terms, listed in order of importance to Philo: ‘bad man’ or ‘vicious man (ὁ φαυ̂λος), ‘fool’ (ὁ ἄφρων), ‘impious man’ (ὁ ἀσεβής), ‘unworthy one’ (ὁ ἀνάξιος), and ‘unrighteous man’ (ὁ ἄδικος).[5] Rather than discuss the vicious soul in the abstract, though he was not averse to doing so at times, Philo instead often explicitly identified a constellation of biblical figures with the vicious soul, including Pharaoh,[6] Esau,[7] Cain,[8] Labon,[9] Balaam,[10] Lamech,[11] and Onan.[12] Without necessarily denying their historicity,[13] Philo associated these characters with what he called temperaments, characteristics, or tendencies of the soul (ψυχῆς τρόπων).[14] Philo did not so much equate each biblical character with the archetypal fool in every way as he rather identified each biblical figure with one or more aspects of a fool. By stressing certain elements in each fool’s character over others, Philo thus emphasized the overall confused, scattered, and variegated character of the bad men against the unified, stable, and consistent character of the sage. In other words, while what is true, beautiful, good, and pious is unified and coherent, as the Stoic doctrine of the oneness of the virtues had purported,[15] that which is false, ugly, vicious, and impious is always many and confused (πολλοὶ καὶ διαφέροντες).[16]

In the bullet-list below, we outline the ways that he identified each of the biblical soul types with various aspects of the fool soul type, presented in order of relative importance to Philo. The variation in the characteristics among the fool soul types themselves illustrates their ethical and psychological confusion. We will then amalgamate of all of these facets a single, composite depiction in order to illustrate the salient features of Philo’s fool soul type as well:  

·      Pharaoh: Pharaoh served as the archetypal fool. Philo interpreted Pharaoh to mean ‘scatterer of noble things’ (ὁ σκεδαστής τῶν καλῶν) or simply ‘scattering’ (σκεδασμός or σκέδασις).[17] Since Egypt represented the body, Pharaoh, as the king of Egypt and foil to the archetypal sage Moses, symbolized body-oriented soul that scatters noble thoughts that relate to virtue and dissipates itself following the passions.[18] Hence, Philo described him as the lover of the body (φιλοσώματος),[19] like Cain, the lover of self (φίλαυτος),[20] pleasure-loving (φιλήδονος),[21] the lover of passion (φιλοπαθής),[22] and proud (ὑπέραυχος),[23] since it fancies itself to be a king. Additionally, as the biblical enemy to God’s people who said, ‘I know not the Lord’,[24] Philo frequently depicted the Pharaoh-soul as the crowning example of impiety (ἀσέβεια),[25] that is both atheistic (ἄθεος)[26] and hostile to God (ἀντίθεος).[27] His atheism takes the form of a rejection of the existence of God in favor of the worship of service of created things.[28] On the surface, this description closely matches that of the Cain-soul below. The difference between the two, however—and it is only hinted at by Philo—is that the ‘atheism’ of the Pharaoh-soul takes the form of polytheism. Philo had already explicitly linked polytheism and atheism when he argued that polytheism creates (κατασκευάζω) a type of atheism, since polytheists cease to honor God when they deify the mortal and created.[29] Pharaoh’s atheism-as-polytheism consequently related to his status as the king of the literal Egypt, whose polytheism Philo singled out as embodying the greatest impiety of all the nations with its worship of idols and sacred beasts.[30]

·      Esau: Esau symbolized the foolish soul that is crafty in vice because scripture described Esau to be a great hunter. This sort of soul is ‘utterly senseless’ (πολλή ἀγνωμοσύνη or ἀφροσύνη), ‘irrational’ (ἄλογος), ‘rustic’ (ἀγροῖκος), and ‘untrained’ (ἀπαιδευσία) in relation to what is true and good.[31] However, his ignorance and foolishness with stupidity or lack of mental prowess. As a ‘skilled hunter’,[32] he could be quite inventive when it comes to practicing vice. Additionally, Philo observed that Esau-souls take folly (ἄνοια) as their counselor and ‘make up’ their own truth about life and reality, a truth that is in fact is a ‘myth’ and ‘fiction’. As a result, such souls become stiff-necked and disobedient to the guidance of right reason.[33]

·      Cain: Cain represented the vicious soul that is especially directed toward self-love (φίλαυτος) and atheism. As such, in contrast to Abel, who refers all that is best to God,[34] the Cain-soul refers all things to itself rather than to God. In contrast to the Pharaoh-soul’s polytheism-as-atheism above, the Cain soul instead constructs a religious creed that excludes God or the gods altogether.[35] Philosophically, Philo linked the Cain-soul’s ‘impious and atheistic opinion’ with the Protagoran dictum that the human mind is the measure of all things.[36] Since the secular world of pleasure, pain, and perpetual change is its only horizon, it consequently ends up experiencing the most painful of the four Stoic passions, namely, fear (φόβος) and grief (λύπη). For such a life, evil is always either present, resulting in grief, or impending, giving rise to fear.[37]

·      Labon: Labon symbolized the vicious soul whose life is governed by sense perception and, by implication, agnosticism. His name means ‘variety of quality’ (ποιότης).[38] As such, the Labon-soul focuses on that which has quality (ὁ τῶν ποιοτήτων ἠρτημένος) rather than on the nature that is without quality (τὴν ἄποιον φύσιν), namely, God.[39] Outward objects of sense perception, whether things of the body or external to the body, serve as the highest good and chief end of life for the Labon-soul, while he God or what benefits the soul or mind.[40] Hence, Philo doesn’t portray Labon as opposed to God so much as indifferent to Him. Inasmuch as Philo argued that the passions take their start from the experience of sense objects, Philo sometimes equated Labon with the passions themselves.[41]

·      Balaam: Balaam represented sophistry, vanity, and illicit pathways toward religious knowledge found among fools. Sometimes, Philo referred to him as a ‘sophist’ (σοφιστής). This type of soul speaks eloquently about the life of virtue, but does not practice what it teaches. Instead, it gives itself over to the pursuit of pleasure and the rule of the passions.[42] At other times, Balaam signified ‘vain people’ (μάταιον λαὸν) that make as their goal the vain pursuit of material gain.[43] In either case, such a life is full of chaos and disturbance since it casts aside all virtue and lives instead in accordance with the unstable world of sense and body.[44] Lastly, Philo occasionally associated the Balaam with the soul that deals in augury, prodigy, and divinization. Using all of these false paths to knowledge, it vainly tries to restamp God’s providence and defaces genuine heaven-sent prophecy in the process.[45]

·      Lamech: Lamech, a minor figure for Philo, signified the worthless man that deliberately chooses wicked ends with the hope that his evil plans will go easily.[46] He illustrates the truism that the soul that strives for any one of the innumerable possible bad objectives always injures itself in the end.[47]

·      Onan: Onan, also a minor character for Philo, symbolized the fool oriented to ‘self love’ (φιλαυτία) and the ‘love of pleasure’ (φιληδονία). He represented those soul types who pursue pleasure above all else.[48]

When we examine Philo’s depictions of the vicious soul types above, we can see a wide variation in characteristics. The discordant and scattered quality of fools means that they wonder in numerous pathless wilds (ἀνοδίαι), as opposed to adhering to the one, royal road of the sage.[49] Hence, Pharoah represented souls bent on polytheism, while Cain symbolized the atheistic soul, Labon with agnosticism, and Balaam with superstition and magic. Similarly, while all soul types are oriented downward to the endless variety of created, material things, each pursues different parts of it. Hence, Philo identifies Pharoah with the body, Labon with the senses or the passions in general, Onan with pleasure, and Balaam with the aquistion of that which is external to the body.

At the same time, if we combine these characteristics into a single, composite portrait, we find that Philo’s fool answers to the contours of the classic depiction of the Stoic fool as morally vicious, godless, ignorant, unskilled in living, wretched, and sick.[50] Firstly, in all of the figures above, Philo consistently described the mind of the bad soul as always oriented downward in that it is given over to and led by the lower parts of the soul, the passions, the body, and earthly concerns.[51] Hence, Philo used a number of terms to describe its many forms found among vicious souls. It may be body-loving (φιλοσώματος),[52] passion-loving (φιλοπαθός), pleasure-loving (φιλήδονος), full of wants (πολυδεής),[53] a money-lover (φιλάργυρος),[54] or a lover of honors (φιλόδοξος).[55] Secondly, the fool lives a wicked life. We see this especially in his descriptions of Pharaoh, Cain, Lamech, and Onan. Throughout his corpus, Philo repeatedly connected the fool’s character to each of the four cardinal virtues, namely, foolishness, injustice, cowardice, and intemperance. Hence, he called the vicious soul a hater of the good (μισόκαλος) and an evil-lover (φιλοπόνηρος), though again each fool may practice on vice more than another.[56] Thirdly, this, in turn, leads to various kinds of impiety in that the bad soul worships and exalts something in shadowy created realm and its own abilities above the One who is truly real. As we can see in Pharaoh, Esau, Cain, and Balaam, this soul type may worship many gods, explicity reject the true God, practice superstition, or simply ignore God altogether. Hence, Philo called the fool both impious (ἀσεβής).[57] Fourthly, Philo described the bad soul as ignorant. This characteristic is especially evident in Philo’s depictions of Esau and Balaam above. It can take many forms. The fool might look knowledgeable to unwise, as in the case of the sophists, clever at devising unjust strategies as in the case of Esau, accomplished in business as in the case of Balaam, or it might be quite uneducated. Whatever the case, as one who is ignorant, the fool’s ‘knowledge’ is in fact conjecture and opinion, insecure, and subject to shifting. Hence, Philo described the fool variously as ignorant (ἀγνωμοσύνη or ἀφροσύνη), uneducated (ἀπαίδευτος), unskilled, (ἄνευ τέχνης), and ‘irrational’ (ἄλογος). Finally, given their ignorance, orientation toward fleeting the passions, especially pleasure, and the ever-changing world of sense, Philo characterized the fool’s soul as unstable, disordered, confused, and scattered.[58] Consequently, every fool is by nature a slave (δοῦλος),[59] especially to pleasure, and his life is wretched (κακοδαίμων),[60] the true Hades.[61]

On the other side of his soul type scheme, Philo opposed the sage to the fool. Contrary to the fool, whose depictions varied widely in detail, reflecting their fragmented and scattered existence, the virtues of Philo’s many sages coinhere as a single set of common attributes. Just as a diamond has many facets, so the sage’s many strengths are one, unified, and cohesive, even if we can distinguish many distinct features. Though Philo associated individual characteristics with each of his sage figures, these differences related primarily to the pathway that each sage took to attain perfection. Indeed, Philo was fond of describing the path to full acquisition of wisdom in terms of the theme of migration or journey (μετανίστημι/ἀποικία) throughout his corpus. This was especially the case for the Abram/Abraham and Jacob/Isreal figues, reflecting their many journey stories in Genesis. However, when we examine their descriptions after they have attained sagehood, we find that all of their descriptions look remarkably uniform.

He utilized a variety of designations for the sage. In order of descending importance, Philo described the sage as the wise man (ὁ σοφός), ‘man of sound character’ (ὁ σπουδαῖος), ‘man of worth’ (ὁ ἀστεῖος), ‘perfect man’ (ὁ τέλειος), ‘worthy one’ (ὁ ἄξιος), ‘righteous man’ (ὁ δίκαιος), and ‘genuine philosopher’ (ὁ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀνόθως). Among the Greek-speaking Stoics, Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic were commonly cited as examples of a sage.[62] Philo likewise cited Socrates as an example of a virtuous man[63] and Diogenes the Cynic as an example of the freedom that a virtuous man possesses,[64] but he preferred figures drawn from Torah as his standard models, including above all, Moses, then Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,[65] and as well as minor figures such as the Levites,[66] Calab,[67] Enoch.[68] Let us take a closer look at each of the biblical sage figures, beginning with the two that attained sagehood apart from progress—Moses, Philo’s favorite sage, and Isaac:

·      Moses: Philo located Moses above all other sages as a sort of super-sage, speaking of him in the superlative phrases such as ‘the holiest of men’[69] and ‘most beloved of God’. Philo lionized Moses as the greatest of legislators, greater than the famed Greek legislators Solon and Lycurgus of Sparta, Moses also surpasses[70] all of the other patriarches in the biblical account to such a degree that the Existent One says to him, “But as for you stand here by Me”.[71] For Philo, this meant that He had advanced Moses by means of his Logos to the very summit of perfection, stationing Moses with none other than the Existent One himself. And just as the Existent One is not subject to addition or diminution in his fullness, immutability and perfection, so also nothing can be be ‘added’ (πρόσθεσιν) to Moses nor is there any more room for further spiritual advance. [72] God has made him a ‘sharer’ (μεταδίδωσιν) in the unchanging repose or rest (ἠρεμία) of his nature,[73] with the result that Moses’ mind and judgment are firmly established and undisturbed by the tumult of passion or of circumstance and he lives in a supreme and perfect happiness’ (τῆς ἄκρας καὶ τελείας εὐδαιμονίας).[74]  Like Israel, he too has undergone initiation into the great mysteries and gained knowledge of the First Cause by lifting his eyes above the ‘shadow’ of created things to a clear vision of the ‘substance’ of the ‘Uncreated One’.[75]

·      Isaac: Isaac symbolized the sage that attained perfection without progress, aquiring virtue by nature. While Isaac, whose name means ‘laughter’ (γέλως),[76] could signify either ‘self-taught wisdom’ (ἡαὐτομαθῆ σοφία)[77] or the good emotion of joy itself (χαρά),[78] he often symbolizes those souls who have acquired virtue by nature (ἐκ φύσεως) without the agency of another.[79] Philo described the Isaac soul type as ‘one who drew for himself from the well of knowledge, listening to no other, learning from no other, and without the aid of another’ (τὸν αὐτηκόου καὶ αὐτομαθοῦς καὶ αὐτουργοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀρυσάμενον) because God has ‘rained down’ from heaven the gifts of self-learning and self-teaching.[80] Now that this soul type possesses the fullness of God’s gifts, it experiences joy.

Biblical figures that attained sagehood through progress:

·      Abraham: Abraham represented the sage that gained perfection through instruction (ἐκ διδασκαλίας) or by learning (μαθήσει).[81] After pursing wisdom as Abram through the study first of nature (φυσιολογία) and then of ethical philosophy (πρὸς τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλοσοφίαν), he finally attained perfection and was renamed Abraham by God.[82] Abraham thus aquired knowledge of the Creator and gained the virtue of ‘piety’ (εὐσέβεια) through study. As a sage, this soul type now treads the royal road of wisdom without swerving either to the left or to the right.[83]

·      Israel: Israel represents the sage that attained perfection through training or practice. After achieving victory in his struggle against the passions by means of training, Jacob becomes Israel,[84] which for Philo meant ‘one who sees God’ (ὁ θεὸν ὁρῶν).[85] By this Philo means that the Isreal-soul, having cast off all of the passions through ascetic training, is now able to intellectually apprehend both the truth that God exists and that He is the maker of all things by means of his powers. As a result, he accord God genuine devotion and honor.[86] Isreal’s apprehension of God or the Existent One falls short of direct vision. No one, not even the wise, is able to ‘see’ the essence (οὐσία) of the ‘Existent One’ himself, since He is the invisible, inapprehensible ‘God of real being’ (ὁ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι θεός), who transcends all things, including his powers. Hence, when Philo said that the Existent One is ‘visible’ (τὸ ὁρατὸν εἶναι τὸ ὂν) to Isreal, he understood scripture to be referring to each of his powers (God, Lord, Reason, etc) that follow behind and attend the Existent One. Paradoxically, the Isreal-soul’s vision resides precisely in his ability to comprehend that the Existent One is incomprehensible (καταλαβεῖν ὅτι ἀκατάληπτος) and to see that he is incapable of being seen (ἰδεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀόρατος).[87]

Philo lastly identified three minor figures, both of which had attained sagehood through progress, though he did not identify the specific pathway for each. Each, however, highlights key aspects of the sage that correspond with their narrative role in scripture:

·      Levites: The Levites symbolized the sage’s pious worship and service to God. For Philo, the Levite mind that has been perfectly cleansed and purified (ὁ τελείως ἐκκεκαθαρμένος νοῦς). It has renounced all that pertains to the dear to the flesh and senses and all that belongs to the world. Instead, it devotes itself unhampered to the things of the noetic world and to the only Uncreate God and Cause of all things.[88]  It represents the sage’s habit of service (θεραπεία) to God that is the special provenance of the wise, whose existence serves as a ransom for the fools.[89] As such, this soul type receives from God the great prizes of peace (εἰρήνη) and priesthood (ἱερωσύνη).[90]

·      Caleb: Caleb signified the perfect repentance of those sages who attained perfection via progress. Caleb figuratively represented the wise that have made a perfect repentence (μετάνοια). Philo interpreted ‘Caleb’ to mean ‘all heart’. Though once a fool, this soul type made a complete conversion to the life of wisdom. As such, it does not waver or oscillate in its change, but rather converted the whole and entire soul (ὅλη δι’ ὅλου ἡ ψυχή) to a supreme perfection.[91]

·      Enoch: Enoch occasionally symbolized the sage who is well pleasing (εὐαρεστέω) to God. These souls have chosen an extreme ascetic life that disolves the earthly element in them so that they have become like unembodied minds (ἀσώματοι διάνοιαι γεγονότες) fixing their purposes on only pleasing God. As a result, God translates such souls from mortality to immortality and from progress to perfection.[92]

When we examine Philo’s portraits of the sage soul types above, we find that in contrast to the fool, whose common features overlay an underlying anarchy and plurality, the sage’s superficial differences coalesce in a set of features shared by all. These characteristics, moreover, closely corresponded to the basic contours of the Stoic sage as morally virtuous, godly, knowledgeable, skilled in living, happy, and healthy.[93] Firstly, in all of the biblical figures above, Philo consistently described the mind of the sagacious soul as oriented upward toward the incorporeal, noetic, and divine realm. The God-loving sage casts its vision away from the body and external objects and instead fixes its sights on the ordinances of virtue instead under the guidance of right reason.[94] As a result, the sage is a person of few wants (ὀλιγοδεής). Philo noted that the sage does have some wants because his body is mortal and requires certain basic necessities to live such as food, water, clothes, and so forth. At the same time, because his soul desires immortality like the Enoch soul above, he does not have the countless needs like the fool, who is driven like Tantalus to satisify his passionate desires.[95] Secondly, the sage lives an utterly virtuous life. The Abraham, Isaac, and Moses soul types especially stress this aspect of sagehood. Philo thus called the sage one who loves virtue (φιλάρετοι), loves goodness (φιλάγαθος), and hates evil (μισοπόνηρος).[96] Thirdly, in both the Levitical and Abrahamic soul types, Philo emphasized the godliness of the sage. In this case, Philo described this soul type as a God-lover (φιλόθεος)[97] and pious (εὐσέβεια). It is the only kind of soul that can offer legitimate service (θεραπεία) as a priest to God. Fourthly, the sage possesses knowledge (ἐπίστημος) and skill (τέχνη) in living.[98] Philo hinted at this notion in his description of the Abraham soul as one who ascended from knowledge of the nature to knowledge of God through instruction and learning. He made it explicit in his descriptions of Isreal as the one who sees the incomprehensible God and Moses as the soul type that is stationed next to God. Finally, given the attributes outlined thus far, Philo characterized the sage’s disposition as stable (βέβαιος) and at peace (εἰρήνη). This especially answers to Philo’s description of the Caleb-soul as one who turned to God with its whole heart without wavering as well as Moses’ firm and undisturbed mind. As such, it lacks nothing in its embrace of God and virtue; instead it always aims at the right moral end and reaches it. Moreover, the impulses and actions of its soul are ‘perfect’ (τέλειος) and smooth, never irratic or immoderate. Conseqently, every sage is free (ἐλεύθερος)[99] and their lives happy (εὐδαιμονία).

In general, Philo’s depiction above matches the main contours of the Stoic ideal for both the fool and sage except for the first characteristic of the mind’s ascent to the noetic sphere or descent to the material realm of the body and senses. The view that the philosophic soul ascends from the shadowy material realm of shadows to the noetic realm of the forms in its quest to comprehend reality reflects Plato’s influence, especially as outlined in his allegory of the cave in book VII of the Republic. The Stoics, in contrast, were much more materialistic in their physics and empiricist in their epistemology. TheStoic sage possessed perfect knowledge and skill anchored in a firm grasp of sensory impressions. The sage certainly did possess notions (νόησις) about corporeal and incorporeals that arise from the conclusions of a demonstration or certain general concepts (ἔννοια) by nature answerable to the Plato’s ideas,[100] but they always remained rooted in the material and sensory experience itself. The ultimate reality that the sage grasped was material. This fundamentally contrasted with the Platonic notion that the intelligible realm of ideas and forms is what is most real and the sensory and material illusory and shadowy. So, in the Platonic system, the soul must take leave of the material to gain a conception of what is true, if even it takes it start from material copy to begin its climb to the archetypes. Consequently, while Philo’s depiction of the sage and fool structurally reflects the rigid dualism of the Stoic ethical system, he nevertheless simultaneously fused it with a Platonic conception of the ascending philosophic soul. 

We are now in a position to understand what Philo meant in the passage above quoted from Philo’s De Migratione Abrahami where he said that the Moses-soul cuts out fierce spirit and desire, while the fool gets rid of the mind. In contrast to the fool, who throws out (ἀποβαλών) the mind, the sage has chosen as his patron-guide the Divine Word. For Philo, the sage does not merely possess a mind while the fool rids himself of it. Rather, the Moses-sage possesses a mind that follows the Divine Word, the very archetype and guide of the sensible cosmos. By emphasizing the connection between the mind of the Moses-soul and the Divine Word, Philo thus stressed his rationality. Thus, the Moses-soul cut out (ἐκτέτμηται) anger and desire, which are the irrational parts of the soul, with the result that only the rational part (τὸ λογικόν) remains. He then further underscored the Moses-soul’s perfect rationality by observing that all of his impulses are ‘truly free’ and do not experience anything that pulls it in the opposite direction.

In contrast, in describing the fool as removing its mind, Philo was emphasizing the fool’s irrationality. To be sure, Philo explicitly called the fool ‘irrational’ and ‘passion-loving’. However, the fool’s irrationality needs further definition. By loping of the mind, was the soul now irrational in the sense that its impulses and actions oppose right reason and the Divine Word and instead it willfully follows the lead of its two horses, namely anger and desire. The fool’s removal of its charioteer and the mind did not mean that it is left mindless or non-rational, as if it had experienced a lobotomy! Instead, as we discussed previously in the section regarding Philo’s distinction between the horseman and rider, the foolish soul exchanges on sort of mind for another. Rather than have a mind that guides and directs the horses, as in the case of the horseman, it is passively carried wherever the horse takes it.

Philo meaning is made yet clearer, moreover, when we note that he went yet further and made the dichotomy between the two souls types absolute and strict. Not only is the mind of either the Moses-soul or the fool rational or irrational, but also completely or absolutely so. Note Philo’s consistent use of totalizing language throughout the passage:

·      ‘…the whole course through every moment’ (ἀεὶ μηδένα διαλείπων χρόνον) of the fool’s journey is dependent on the anger and desire

·      Genesis 3.14 applies to ‘every irrational and passion-loving man’ (ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀλόγου καὶ  φιλοπαθοῦς ἀνθρώπου)

·      The fool completely removes the head [implicit]

·      Moses ‘offers whole burnt sacrifices’ (τὰς ὁλοκαύτους τῆς ψυχῆς ἱερουργῇ)

·      Moses cleanses away ‘every desire in every shape’ (ὅλον τὸ ἐπιθυμίας εἶδος ἐκνίψεται)

·      Moses cuts away the ‘warlike spirit in its completeness’ (ἀφελεῖ… σύμπαντα τὸν πολεμικὸν θυμόν)

·      ‘…nothing’ (μηδενὸς) pulls against the mind of the sage

As we have already noted, the dualist and opposing structure of Philo’s soul scheme already reflects a Stoic orientation. To that we can also add that Plato never envisioned his philosophical or kingly soul type removing the two horses. These irrational parts of the soul are permanent and distinct parts of the soul. Conversely, in the case of the tyrannical soul, the large desire-drone dominates the mind. Nevertheless, the rational part of the soul remains, even if subservient to desire. Hence, for Plato, the distinction between his soul types is always a matter of degree.

As we can see in the observations above, however, Philo does not deal in the language of degree. Rather, in Stoic manner, he opposed the two soul types categorically. This totalizing language in turn helps us to elucidate what Philo meant when he described the removal of the horses or the charioteer respectively. These excessive, disorderly impulses, which Philo identified with the two horses of desire and anger, are none other than impulses of the mind itself. In other words, Philo was saying that the fool and sage represent two orientations of the mind that initiate two contrary types of impulses in the soul. In the case of the sage, his mental impulses are always orderly, moderate, and in accord with right reason and nature, while in the case of the fool, his mental impulses are disorderly, excessive, and opposed to right reason. When used in the context of the chartiot metaphor, the mental impulses in the fool are, by definition, the two horses, namely fierce spirit and desire. Consequently, the perfected Moss-soul has attained what Philo called in the parallel passage from Legum Allegoriarum, apatheia, or freedom from all passion (συνόλως ἀπάθειαν),[101] whereas by contrast he called the fool passion-loving (φιλοπαθής).  

Charioteering as metripatheia: Aaron as an example of the progressing soul

Finally, in the parallel passage from Legum Allegoriarum, Philo offered an extended discussion of the chariot metaphor in relation to the soul’s spiritual and moral journey. In this case, however, he introduced a third soul type, namely, the Aaron soul:

God assigned to the wise man a share of surpassing excellence, even the power to cut out the passions. You observe how the perfect man always makes perfect freedom from passion (τελεία ἀπάθεια) his study. But Aaron, the man who is making gradual progress (ὅ προκόπτων), holding a lower position (δεύτερος ὢν) [than Moses], practices moderation (ἀσκέω μετριοπάθεια), as I have said; for his power does not go so far (ἀδυνατέω) as to enable him to cut out (ἐκτεμεῖν) the breast and the high-spirited element, but it brings to it, as charioteer and guide, reason with the virtues attached to it... [102]

Later in the text, Philo went on to contrast the Aaron soul and Moses soul in relation to the first horse, anger:

Aaron, then, being inferior (δεύτερος) to Moses who cuts the breast…clean out—suffers it not to be carried away by random impulses (οὐκ ἐᾷ αὐτὸν ἀκρίτοις ὁρμαῖς ἐκφέρεσθαι), for he is afraid that, if it be given the rein, it may some day get unmanageable, as a horse does, and trample down all the soul. No, he curbs (θεραπεύω) and controls (ἐπιστομίζω) it, first by reason, that being driven by an excellent (ἄριστος) charioteer, it may not get too restive (σφόδρα ἀφηνιάζω).[103]

In the same way, Philo later contrasted the Aaron soul and Moses soul in relation the other horse. Unlike Plato, however, who had identified the second horse with desire alone, Philo had equated it with either desire or pleasure. He had argued that the love of pleasure begets desire.[104] So, in his view, the appetitive part of the soul is the location of both passions. The appetitive part of the soul loves pleasure and either seeks it when it is absent or enjoys it when it is present.[105] With this in mind, Philo discussed the Moses and Aaron souls relate to the appetitive part of the soul:

In a corresponding manner we shall find Moses, the wise man, in his perfection (ὁ σοφὸς τέλειος), scouring away and shaking off pleasures (ἡδονή), but the man of gradual improvement (ὁ προκόπτων) not so treating pleasure in its entirety, but welcoming simple and unavoidable (ἀνάγκη) pleasure, while declining that which is excessive (περισσός) and over-elaborate (περίεργος) in the way of delicacies.[106]

In these passages Philo typified Aaron as the one who is making moral progress (ὅ προκόπτων). This soul type differs from both sage and fool above. On the one hand, the Aaron soul is inferior to the Moses soul. While the Moses soul is perfect (τέλειος), the Aaron soul remains imperfect (ἀτελής).[107] The Moses soul experiences apatheia, that is, the complete freedom from all passion, whereas the Aaron soul merely pratices the moderation of the passions, not their removal altogether. The Moses soul possesses the power to cut out the breast, while the Aaron soul does not. It can only curb and guide the high spirit and desire. So, while the Aaron soul still experiences anger, though in moderation, the Moses soul experiences no anger at all, only inner tranquility.[108] In a corresponding manner, later in the passage Philo observed that the sage ‘washes the entire belly’, namely, all of bodily pleasures. The sage even foregoes and rejects necessary food and drink as for instance when Moses ate no bread and drank no water for forty days.[109]The man of gradual advance, in contrast, merely ‘washes the inwards and the feet, but not the whole belly’, that is to say, he avoids excessive and elaborate delicacies, but still welcomes the simple and unavoidable pleasures connected to necessary food and drink.[110] As a consequence, Philo noted that the Moses soul experiences virtue apart from any toil (ἄπονος) at all, while the Aaron soul exerts much toil (πόνος) in its efforts to charioteer the stiff-necked and restive horses of anger and desire.[111]

On the other hand, the Aaron soul is superior to the other prototypical fool soul types discussed above such as Pharoah, Cain or Balaam. Whereas these fools are fixed upon their vicious existences, the Aaron soul instead aims to make genuine moral improvement—hence Philo’s favorite term for this type of soul as ‘one making progress’ (ὅ προκόπτων).  Whereas Philo described prototypical fools as passion-loving souls whose entire course depends on fierce spirit and desire, the progressing Aaron soul rather curbs (θεραπεύω), controls (ἐπιστομίζω), and trains (παιδεύω) both of these parts of the soul to be gentle. Unlike the fool, whose entire course is irrational, since it has given its mind over to the inferior impulses of anger and desire (ἐκδοθῆναι τῷ χείρονι), the progressing soul does not permit its anger to be ‘carried away by random impulses’ (ἀκρίτοις ὁρμαῖς ἐκφέρεσθαι), but curbs its ‘excessive impetuosity’ (ἡ ἐπὶ πλέον φορά).[112] The distinction is curious since anger, as a Stoic passion, is by definition a random and excessive impulse. The key difference between the prototypical fool above and the Aaron soul, then, lies in the degree of randomness and excessiveness that characterizes the passion. While the foolish soul gives itself over to unmitigated anger, the Aaron soul, though still angry, moderates the soul’s motion and reduces its randomness when gripped by the passion. Additionally, the fool prefers the ease (ῥᾳστώνη) of incontinence and bodily pleasure to the toil that necessarily follows those things that are profitable (τὰ συμφέροντα) for the soul.[113] Hence, the fool, as a lover of pleasure, ‘moves on the belly’, that is to say, it ever seeks after pleasures connected to bodily sense perception, especially those associated with eating, drinking, and sexual indulgence.[114] The Aaron soul in contrast prefers the hardship (κακοπάθεια) of discipline and ‘toil for the sake of virtue’ (ὁ ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς πόνος) to the fool’s quest for pleasure.[115] Thus, while the fool serves created things, the Aaron soul has instead made a fundamental shift in its philosophical and religious orientation toward knowing and honoring God, which in turn purifies reason and begins the healing of the soul. As such, Philo argued that the Aaron soul is a recipient of God’s favor since perverted mind of the fool cannot be the source of its own purification. Instead, the soul’s turning from vice to virtue, which accounts for its transition from fool to progressing soul, comes from beyond the soul from God.[116]

As was the case with the sage and the fool above, Philo treated numerous biblical figures in addition to Aaron as types of the progressing soul, including Seth, Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abram, and Jacob. Listed below are the soul types that represented various types of the progressing soul in order of their appearance in the biblical narrative:

·      Seth: Seth represents those minds that make a beginning toward good disposition and virtue.[117] He stands as the head of the race of souls that acknowledge that God is the author of everything and love virtue.[118]

·      Enos: Enos typifies hope in God. He represents those soul types who are taking their first step on the journey toward virtue because of the expectation of good things from God, namely, happiness, the ability to see God, and to live in accordance with nature.[119]

·      Enoch: Enoch generally symbolized the gift of repentance when the soul begins to make a ‘change for the better’ (πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἡ μεταβολή). Such souls abandon the base and instead choose the excellent.[120] Enoch could also symbolize those who acknowledge that everything comes from God and thus seek to please God alone. As a result, God translates such souls from mortality to immortality and from progress to perfection. In this case, Philo associate Enoch not with progressing souls, but with the sage.[121]

·      Noah: Noah, representing those who are perfect in virtue relative to their generation, though not absolutely so.[122] As such, such souls have made significant progress, though they fall short of the perfection of the sage.

·      Abram: Philo interpreted Abram to mean ‘uplifted father’. As such, he represented the ‘virtue-loving soul’ who begins his search for the true God by first contemplating the harmonious order and beauty of nature.[123] He then rises higher to pursue the philosophy of the heavens and the beings that dwell there. Finally, this soul type mounts up yet higher through its love of knowledge to explore the divine nature itself.[124] As a result, the Abram-soul finally attains perfection through teaching and study.

·      Jacob: Jacob symbolized the man of earnest effort.[125] He embodies the notion of progress (προκοπή)[126] by means of ‘toil’ (πόνος). When connected with his later identity as perfect Isreal, he represents the soul that is perfected in virtue through training or discipline (ἐξ ἀσκήσεως).[127] His training includes such practices as investigation, examination, reading, hearing, attention, self-mastery, indifference to those things that ought to be categorized as indifferent, living only on what is necessary, low and mean, and eschewing luxury, pleasure, and popularity.

·      The nation of Israel: Philo approached the nation of Isreal from the perspective of their biblical lineage and from the story of the exodus. With regard to their ancestry, the people of Israel represented the ‘new race’ and ‘holy nation’ of souls that springs forth from Enos, Enoch and especially Noah. Their family tree terminates in sages such as Abraham, Isaac, and Moses.[128] With regard to the exodus, the journey of the Isrealites from Egypt to the Promised Land served as an example of the long and arduous journey from vice toward virtue. In contrast to the journey of Abram, which terminates in wisdom through learning (ie. Abraham), the Isrealites themselves never reach sagehood. Instead, Philo treated the nation of Isreal as a symbol of the journey itself, that is, the progression of the soul.

·      Aaron: He symbolized an inferior (δεύτερος ὢν) stage in the progress of the soul to that of Moses. The Aaron-soul corresponds to the soul in which the rational part trains and curbs the lower parts of the soul with the result that their passions are moderated (μετριοπάθειαν). Philo elsewhere described Aaron as counted neither among those dead to the life of virtue, nor among those who live in supreme happiness. Rather, he ‘touches’ (ἐφάπτεται) both. Nevertheless, since he aspires to moral excellence and aims for the truth by the ‘deliberate choice of the good’ (ἡ ἑκούσιος αἵρεσις τἀγαθοῦ), he is making genuine improvement.[129]

As we can see, Aaron comes at the end of a series of biblical figures that chronologically appear in the biblical narrative as it unfolds. Each figure highlighted different aspects of this middling stage. Seth served as a symbol of the inauguration in the life of virtue, Enos of hope, Enoch of repentance, Noah of relative justice, Abram of progressing through learning, Jacob of progress through discipline, and the nation of Isreal of the journey itself. In the same way, Aaron represented the moderation of the passions exercised by progressing souls.

These typifications also broadly corresponded with specific moments in the soul’s progession toward virtue. In De agricultura, Philo sketched a scheme for the moral progress of the soul that leads from vice and ignorance toward perfection in virtue and the vision of God.[130] He divided the soul’s progression into a series of stages:[131]

·      The fool: As discussed above, Philo’s portrayed the fool as morally vicious, godless, ignorant, unskilled in living, wretched, and sick.

·      The beginner (ὁ ἀρχόμενος): Philo likened the beginner to a suitor (μνηστήρ), who hopes to one day marry disipline (παιδεία).[132] Though such souls still lack knowledge, God has given them a readiness to learn (εὐμάθεια) so that they begin the journey toward virtue.[133] Philo characterized this sort of soul especially with hope for a better life.

·      The progressing one (ὁ προκόπτων): Philo compared the one who is progressing to the husbandman (γεωργός). Just as he cares for the trees to ensure their growth, so the progressing soul seeks to bring about the utmost development in the principles of prudence.[134]

·      The recently perfected (ὁ πρῶτον τέλειος): Philo likened these souls to a house whose plaster has just received the finishing touches, but has not quite become compact and firmly settled (πῆξις).[135] Such souls have reached completeness, but remain unpracticed and unaware of their perfection.[136]

·      The sage: As outlined above, Philo depicted the sage as morally virtuous, godly, knowledgeable, skilled in living, happy, and healthy

This partition the stages of the soul’s progress into fool, beginner, progressing soul, recently perfected, and sage, still fit under Philo’s overarching Stoic division of all souls into fools and sages. The fool comprehended ‘pure’ fools such as the Pharoah soul above, the beginners, and those who are progressing, while the sage included those who are newly perfected as well as the experienced and settled sage. Philo variously referred to middle soul type variously as one who is making progress (προκοπή), as one that is on the way to betterment (βελτίωσις), [137] as a practicer (ὁ ἀσκητής), or simply as the soul type that is ‘in the middle’ (ἡ μέση [ψυχή]).[138] On the one hand, though Philo distinguished the beginner and progressing soul from one another, both were instances of souls that are making progress. As such, he distinguished both from newly perfected soul and the sage as those who remain ‘imperfect’ (ἀτελής), while like the Aaron Soul above both alternatively differ from the fool proper in that they have turned toward God.[139] The beginner and progressing soul differ from one another, on the other hand, with regard to the degree of progress they have made toward virtue and perfection. The beginner is more inexperienced (ἄπειρος) and ignorant than the progressing soul, who has practiced virtue and discipline for some time now. [140] Nevertheless, both the beginner and progressing soul are still counted as fools since both remain fundamentally ignorant, unskilled, and imperfect.

Philo’s distinction among varying degrees of progress within the fool soul type was of Stoic provenance as well. The Stoics had differentiated those foolish souls that are making genuine progress toward virtue and sagehood from those that are not, referring to the progressing sort of fool as one who is progressing (ὅ προκόπτων) toward virtue.[141]  They compared these later types of fools to a drowning man that is swimnming toward the water’s surface. These souls are still fools inasmuch as they remain below the water’s surface. As a consequent, they are still in danger of drowning. Nevertheless, they have made genuine progress toward reaching water’s surface and attaining the life of virtue and wisdom.[142]

Philo’s division between newly perfected souls and the mature sage above reflected a Stoic outlook as well. The Stoics had distinguished between those perfected souls that have only recently attained perfection from those who have firmly remained wise for some time, although they didn’t use different terms to distinguish the two. They had argued that the newly perfected often are quite unaware of the fact that they have arrived at perfection and hence may easily fall away again into foolishness whereas the sage has not only attained perfection, but also is both cognizant of the fact and remains firm and steady in his virtue through practice.[143] Philo made the same fundamental distinctions between the recently perfected and the mature sage. Like the Stoics, Philo’s recently perfected are still unpracticed in virtue and unconscious of their wisdom (διαλεληθότες εἶναι σοφοί).[144]

Philo thus overlaid this scheme of souls in various stages of progress toward virtue on the biblical narrative. Beginning with Seth, Philo treated various members of his family tree as types of different degrees of moral advancement. In the De Posteritate Caini, Philo schematized the biblical lineage into a series of three stages of improvement, each building on the previous. The first advance begins with Seth, the second with Noah, and the third with Abraham, culminating with Moses, the man who is wise in all things.[145] Conversely, in De Abrahamo and in De Praemiis et Poenis, Philo simplified this scheme into two stages, each of which was comprised of three soul types. Enos, Enoch, and Noah made up the first triad and Abraham, Isaac and Jacob the second. The first triad symbolized progressing souls in the first stages of the soul’s journey toward virtue and the second as those in the latter stages.[146] Although one might be tempted to try to make these schematizations fit Philo’s fivefold division into fool, beginner, progressing soul, recently perfect, and sage, no exact correspondence exists. At first flush, Philo’s division of the progression into two stages in De Abrahamo for instance might appear to correspond to his beginning-progressing soul distinction, but only Enos as a symbol of hope and Enoch as a type for repentance could be construed as a beginner. Noah, who is also a member of the first set of soul types, has made such progress that Moses called him perfect in his generation, though he is not absolutely good like the sages who would come later.[147] As such, each of these biblical figures rather fit into the spectrum of soul at different stages of the journey from foolishness to perfection. As such, the lineage that extends from Seth to the nation of Isreal and Moses represented the beginning of the race of soul types that are truly reasonable.[148]

Philo’s portrayal of the Aaron soul as a symbol of the moderation of the passions in the progressing soul was particularly compatible with his use of the chariot metaphor. As noted in our discussion of above, Plato’s ideal was not the eradication of anger, desire, or erotic love, but their subordination to and harmonization with reason. Hence, in his employment of the chariot metaphor, the charioteer manages first to constrain and then later to tame the black horse, but at no point does the charioteer remove either of the horses. In the same way, since the Aaron soul is unable to cut out desire and anger entirely, he must settle for the more limited goal of metriopatheia (μετριοπάθεια) or the taming of the horses/passions through training.[149] This notion of metriopatheia reflected the Academic-Peripatetic application of the ideal of the mean to the soul and to the passions. In opposition to the Stoic notion of apatheia or the complete cutting off of all passions in the sage, the Peripatetics and Academics had argued instead that the aim of ethics was rather to exercise each passion in an intermediate manner without excess or deficiency. For instance, the virtuous soul desires, but in a manner that is neither self-indulgent nor insensible. Similarly, the soul can be angry at the right things and at the right time and in the place, but it should not be hot-tempered and irascible, nor slavish and inirascible. Rather than take sides in the philosophical dispute between Peripatetics/Academics and Stoics, Philo instead incorporated both paradigms into his scheme of moral progression. The soul passes from Stoic fool to Peripatetic/Academic progressing soul to Stoic sage.

Among his various soul types, Philo’s progressing soul thus most closely matched Plato’s description of the soul in both the Republic and the Pheadrus. In the passages quoted from Legum Allegoriarum above, observe the characteristics of Philo’s description of the Aaron soul type:

·      The Aaron soul practices moderation

·      The Aaron soul is powerless to cut out the breast [and belly]

·      Reason serves as the charioteer and guide to the breast and spirited part

·      The Aaron soul does not allow the breast to be carried away by random impulses

·      Reason curbs and controls the breast

·      Reason does not allow the breast to not get too restive

·      Philo describes reason in the Aaron soul as ‘excellent’ (ἄριστος)

·      The Aaron soul welcomes necessary pleasures, but declines excessive delicacies

Like Plato’s description of the chariot metaphor, Philo’s Aaron soul possessed reason/charioteer and horses/breast and belly. This contrasts with Philo’s description of the Moses soul, who has effectively removed the breast and belly entirely, leaving a chariot team without horses. Philo’s description of the Aaron soul’s reason as ‘excellent’ likewise matches Plato’s consistently positive portrayal of the charioteer in the Pheadrus and Republic. It also matches Philo’s positive depiction of reason in the sage, but contrasts sharply with his characterization of the mind of the fool, whose reason is itself perverted and oriented toward what is bad. Similarly, like Plato’s charioteer, Philo described the role of reason in the soul as that of a charioteer and guide to the horses. Reason ceases that function in the sage, who no longer possesses any horses, while in the fool, reason fails to guide and direct, but rather is passively carried along. Although Philo ignores Plato’s nuanced treatment of the relation among charioteer/reason, white horse/spirited part and black horse/appetitive part as noted in our comparison of his depiction of the chariot metaphor to that of Plato’s above, like Plato’s charioteer, he nevertheless depicted reason in the Aaron soul as aiming to moderate, control, and curb the horses. This contrasted with Philo’s sage, who ‘cuts off’ both horses, and the fool, who horses both run riot.

All in all, then, Philo’s depiction of the Aaron soul most closely approached Plato’s description of the soul as manifest in the chariot metaphor. In the Aaron soul, the charioteer is unable to cut off the horses, just as both horses are permanent elements in Plato’s depiction of the soul. In both, the mind is virtuous and guides the lower parts. Moreover, like Plato’s better soul types, the charioteer in the Aaron soul type controls the horses. In both depictions, the soul only indulges in what is ‘necessary’ and ‘useful’ (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μόνον καὶ χρήσιμον) for the nourishment of the body and no more.[150] Thus, Philo’s moral scheme advanced from Stoic fool to Platonic philosopher-king to Stoic sage.

Conclusion: Philo’s creative integration of Stoic, Platonic, and biblical metaphors of the soul

Philo creatively synthesized a wide variety of opposing psychological elements current in his day. In the first chapter, we explored Philo’s extensive use of the Stoic eightfold conception of the soul, divided between a hegemonic and rational part centered on the heart and the seven non-rational lower parts of the soul that extend from the heart like the tentacles of an octopus, including the five senses, faculty of speechand faculty of generation. In chapter two we then described how Philo also made use of Plato’s tripartite division of the soul into mind, spirited, and appetitive parts. This immediately raises the question of how Philo could draw upon both Stoic and Platonic descriptions of the soul, which represented the two opposing poles of thought in ancient psychology. In chapter three we then turn to Philo’s use of Plato’s chariot metaphor as a guide to how he went about creatively integrating the two opposing psychologies into his own allegorical reading of the Torah. For Philo, the charioteer consistently represented the mind, but the horses could represent either Platonic anger and desire or the Stoic senses. In additional, Philo made numerous modifications in his description of the elements of Plato’s charioteer metaphor in the direction of Stoicism, including his treatment of both horses as opposed to the charioteer and violent, his failure to mention either Plato’s wings or erotic love, his morphing of the metaphor into the Stoic horse/rider metaphor, and finally, his integreation of the metaphor into a Stoic framework for the soul’s moral journey to virtue and wisdom.

We also noted in each chapter that the biblical creation narrative about Adam, Eve, and the serpent played a significant role in the shape of Philo’s psychology. He had coordinated both the Platonic tripartite and Stoic eightfold division of the soul with his biblical typology of Adam-Eve-Serpent. Adam corresponded to the mind/hegemon in both philosophies. He related Eve with sense-perception. He could understand Eve as the Stoic seven lower parts of the soul, which included not only the five senses, but also the faculties of generation and speech or Plato’s bodyguards to the citidel of the mind. Philo could likewise relate the Serpent, pleasure, to either the Stoic passions or Plato’s spirited and appetitve parts. For Philo, pleasure represented the starting point for the other three cardinal Stoic passions of desire, grief, and fear. Since Philo treated anger as a type of desire on the basis of a Stoic classification of the passions, he could in turn relate pleasure to Plato’s appetitive and spirited parts of the soul, desire and anger.

In the third chapter, we likewise observed how Philo had encased his use of the chariot metaphor within a Platonic and Stoic vision for the soul’s intellectual and moral end, which in turn was related to the unfolding of the biblical narrative in Torah. Philo had identified the soul’s intellectual and spiritual end with the Platonic quest to leave behind the shadowy world of the senses and opinion and soar to the incorporeal and intelligible realm of the forms and beyond to a vision of the truly existent God himself.[151] At the same time, he matched the soul’s moral end with the ideal of the apathetic Stoic sage. He overlaid both, however, on an allegorical reading of Moses. After describing a Platonic creation of the noetic archetypes of the soul and their subsequent copies in the sensible cosmos, he described the soul’s fall into the passions through Serpent’s/pleasure’s attack of Adam/the mind through Eve/sense perception. He then used the biblical story that begins with Seth and Abel and culminates in Moses to describe the Stoic progression of the soul from fool to progressing soul to sage. Each figure in the biblical account symbolized different elements in the soul’s journey, depending on their role in the story and the meaning of their name. Cain and Pharaoh as key antagonists in the biblical narrative represent archetypal fools, while protagonistics such as Abraham, Isaac, and Moses symbolized sages. Philo identified his depiction of the soul as a charioteer and two horses with those progressing soul that are passing from fool to sage. By so doing, he connected the Peripatetic-Academic ideal of metriopatheia with the aims of intermediate soul such as the Aaron soul type.

In the end, Philo saw himself as an adherent of the sage Moses above all. Moses not only embodied wisdom as the greatest sage in his own person, but also served as a divinely inspired historian and legislator.[152] Moreover, Moses authored the holy scriptures, which describes the genesis of the world, the lives of good souls that embody a life that accords with nature, as well as the statutes of the Torah that are copies of the law of nature.[153] Since Philo accepted the authority of Moses above all, his allegorical reading of the Law inspired, informed, and shaped his decisions regarding when, where, and how he might use elements drawn from Platonic and Stoic psychology. Given the mythical, narrative, and legislative form of books of Moses gave Philo great flexibily to creatively relate his religious philosophy to that of the other schools. For Philo, the way of Moses transcended the sectarian disputes existent among the other philosophical schools, even as he his philosophy shared many elements with them.[154]As such, Philo’s free use of Platonic and Stoics philosophical elements strongly contrasted, for instance, with a partisan like Galen, who vigorously defended Plato’s tripartite psychology against Chryssipus’ monistic psychology in De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. His approach might initially appear to be more akin to that of an Academic like Cicero, who in the Tusculanarum disputationum or de Finibus likewise drew freely from competing philosophies. Philo could show a surprising indifference to basic philosophical questions at times. Against the Stoics, he might pronounce the soul incorporeal, but then join them in identifying its essense as breath.[155] In the same way, he showed little interest in definitively locating the mind in either the head like Plato or the heart like Chryssipus.[156] Nevertheless, Philo’s Mosaic dogmatism strongly distintinguished his approach to philosophy from the skepticism of someone like Cicero as the basis for utilizing psychological elements drawn from the other schools. The philosophy of Moses represented a vision for life that transcended that of the other schools even as it was able to comprehend within itself Platonic and Stoic elements.

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