This book review has been published in
The International Journal of General Systems, vol. 37, no. 2, April 2008, 131-134. (With minor changes.)

CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS, by Harold I Brown. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2007, 514 pages, ISBN 13: 978-0415-70182-2 (hbk),
ISBN13: 978-0-203-96790-4 (ebk)

1. Introduction
All thinking and communication, from the simple daily life to the most highly cognitively scientifically/technologically level, are founded on some concepts (principles, and other intellectual or cognitive guides) – these being implicitly and explicitly embedded in all knowledge systems! That is, each discipline is characterized by a group of specialized ‘complex theoretical and hypothetical systems’, and progress means the addition of new concepts. Ones accepted, these concepts are automatically (sub-consciously?) employed without really analyzing them. As the whole phenomenon of concepts is very fundamental from various theoretical and applied viewpoints, Brown’s exploration into how these new concepts are developed and adopted, and how older concepts are replaced, becomes a rather challengingly basic scientific endeavor. Thus, this approach is part of applied meta-philosophy (or practical metaphysics); see my review of a book on metaphysics in this journal.

2. Content and approach used
This thorough overview deals in 11 chapters with the following (merely exemplars of sections are listed): 1. Studying concepts: variation, analysis, language, naturalism, incommensurability, relativism; 2. Conceptual historical journeys: physical sciences, mathematics, biology, technology, generators of conceptual change; 3. Some theories of concepts: Locke, etc., empiricism, analytical-synthetic distinction I (followed leter by II, etc.); 4. Wilfrid Sellars—Exposition, Interpretation & Critique: descriptive, formal & prescriptive concepts; models & analogies; conceptual modifications; 5. Reconstruction: language, systemic role, individuation, self-reference, circularity, reflexive consistency, concept of concept, intra- & extra systemic relations; 6. Clarification, Responses & Refinements: cognitive-historical analysis, fine-structure of conceptual content; 7. Conceptual Analysis I (see part II, etc. also)--Causation: necessary connections; 8. Conceptual Analysis II--Epistemic Concepts: prepositional knowledge, justification, truth; 9. Historical Study I--17th Century Physics; 10. Historical Study II--Interactions: Qualitative picture, mathematical framework, angular momentum, quantum theory, unification plus Appendix with some mathematical concepts; 11. Conceptual Change, Incommensurability & Progress.
Most chapters have a conclusion, some with summary and preview: a highly recommendable approach! A Glossary would have been appreciated.
To be brief: the historical approach is, of course, setting the stage for present and future developments of concepts; the preferential selection of Sellars’ philosophy is well explained and well founded; the degree of completeness by referring preferentially to several basic sciences is representing the usual philosophy-of-science commitment – meaning that most derived or hybrid sciences are ignored (as done by most philosophers!). This means that many of the earth-sciences or geological concepts are ignored; e.g. such as concepts (or hypotheses) of continental drift/plate tectonics, turbidity currents, origin of petroleum, ore deposits, among others.

3. Theoretical and practical applications: disciplines mentioned
Brown’s treatment of conceptual systems is rather meta-physical, yet the topics are of practical application, as repeatedly demonstrated by historical and philosophical discussions. That is, the reader has to interpret beyond his style of discussion – i.e. he has to reconstruct an explicit pragmatism from the perspective of numerous scientific/technological professions.
For example, Griffith (2007) states (paraphrasing): ‘the meaning of the concept “genes” is shifting and elusive … genes are an example of numerous scientific concepts which are research tools, as much as glassware and chemicals used by biologists, for instance. The gene was a hypothetical something used in 1909 to describe the results of experiments … however, new work required new tools and as the work of geneticists has changed, the concept of the gene changed – new definitions were required.’ The concept may even be a metaphor which ‘becomes increasingly refined’. Thus, scientists ‘tailor concepts to the advances in knowledge’.
Here an illustration of the applied philosophical complexities involved. Hjørland and Pedersen (2005) and Szostak (2007) dealing with information technology, thus with information classification, categorization, and retrieval refer to (paraphrasing) ‘conceptualization, concepts of concepts, among others, mentioning the two theories of concepts … namely Aristotle’s “classical theory” and Kuhn’s “prototype theory”’. Hjørland and co-researcher highlight that: ‘family resemblance concepts form hierarchical structures in which a general concepts decomposes into more specific concepts that may again decompose into yet more specific concepts, and so forth, in other words taxonomy. …conceptual systems are dynamic entities, which may undergo change. … Theories or models … provide causal and explanatory links that hold individual concepts together and establish taxonomic relations to other concepts as required by many disciplines ….’ An example: the ‘Gamow versus Bohr dispute on the nuclear disintegration process in physics. … According to pragmatism, concepts are ways to classifying the world that serve human purposes’. Szostak emphasizes the needs of much more research into concepts of theories, methods, and phenomena, for instance – all in the context of establishing a more efficient information classification system!
As to the historical evolution of concepts, Brown mentions numerous knowledge domains such as (in alphabetical order) anthropology, astronomy (Galileo, Copernicus, earth motion), biology (evolution, Darwinism), chemistry (elements, isotopes, periodic table, etc.), economics, geology, linguistics (nomenclatures, semantics), physics (Cartesian, Newtonian, gravity, light theory, mechanics, motion, electromagnetism, quantum, radioactivity, etc.), mathematics (complex numbers, geometry, group theory, logarithms, probability, statistics), meteorology, philosophy (cause-effect relationships, determinism, empiricism, naturalism, relativism, …), and psychology (e.g. cognition).
The changing meaning of the concept of ‘electromagnetic field’ is beautifully compared/contrasted in Table 6.1 comprising the information of Farrady—Maxwell—Lorentz—Einstein versus ontological status—function—mathematical structure—causal power. This leads logically into …

4. Presentation, e.g. degree of difficulty
It may seem that the book is written strictly for philosophers and those interested in philosophical aspects of their professions, but Brown’s style of writing is lucid and his arguments easy to follow. The Contents comprises all subtitles of the many sections of chapters and together with the good index allows a quick overview of the book’s coverage. All sections are numbered: good for personal cross-referencing.
Although the preface is short and could have covered additional introductory information, it is chapter 1 that proffers a valuable starting point for any conceptual-system novice. Also, consider reading first chapter 11 as it offers a good overview and a final conclusion. Inasmuch as the chapters comprise frequently lengthy descriptions, those wishing a quicker overview prior to enjoying detailed discussions can peruse the interim conclusions of chapters 3 to 10.
Repeatedly (in numerous book reviews) I express my disappointment that in general philosophers refuse to utilize tables and illustrations! Brown offers a few (one superb example mentioned above), but more could have been prepared, in particular comparative/contrastive-type tables and flow-chart-like diagrams.

5. Readership appeal
This book is of interest to any above-average interested and educated professional involved beyond daily-job-related demands because it requires intellectual devotion to seek answers to fundamental meta-philosophical queries not to be found in most publications. Scientific progress, innovation, importance and limitations of ‘generalizations’ (the aim of much scientific search for natural laws), research methodology successes and failures, interpretations, predictions, and much more is dealt with.
To be more specific: Brown addresses researchers in philosophy (with its numerous sub-disciplines), history (how do memés transmit new concepts is not answered?), logicians, linguists (e.g. interested in semantics), and semioticists of science. The following will want to read the book: all scientists [e.g. physicists, astronomers, biologists (including evolutionists/Darwinists), geologists and environmentalists], mathematicians, even futurologists (attempting to use past developments to predict the future of science/technology), computer scientists, court-expert witnesses and lawyers/attorneys may find ‘arguments’ useful in reasoning-out their cases since they will find debates on evidence, terminologies, etc. Psychological query: what range of tacit knowledge, in addition to explicit profession-related types, is helpful in developing or discovering new concepts!?
Anyone attempting to propose or formulate a new concept, principle, or even a new hypothesis or theory must read this book (even though the differences between these four have not been deliberated!). After all, History of Science is an excellent guide – sometimes (or always?)!
Note: This book review underwent slight editorial changes, e.g. shortening of References list.

References

● GRIFFITHS, P. 2007, The genome’s quirky genius. The Australian Newspaper, Higher Education Section, March 21, ’07, page 39.
● HJØRLAND, B. and PEDERSON, K.N. 2005, A substantive theory of classification for information retrieval. Journal of Documentation, vol. 61, No. 5, 582-597.
● ØROM, A. 2003, Knowledge organization in the domain of art studies – history, transition and conceptual changes. Knowledge Organization, vol. 30, nos. 3-4, pp. 128-143.
● REY, G. 1998, Concepts. In: Craig, E. (Ed), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 505-517 (London: Routledge).
● SZOSTAK, R. 2006, Classifying Science: Phenomena, Data, Methods, Practice. Book review in: International Journal of General Systems, vol. 35, no. 4, 472-478.
● SUTCLIFFE, J.P. 1993, Concept, class, and categories in the tradition of Aristotle. In: van Mechelen, L., Hampton, J., Michalski, R.S. and Theuns, P. (Eds), Categories and Concepts: Theoretical Views and Inductive Data Analysis, pp. 35-66 (London: Academic Press).
● WILSON, F. 1997, Concepts. In: Garrett, D. and Barbenell E. (Eds), Encyclopedia of Empiricism, pp. 73-75 (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers).
● WOLF K. H. 1988, Introduction – a scientific-philosophical view of methodology. In: G.V. Chilingarian and K.H. Wolf (Eds), Diagenesis, vol. II, pp. 1-41 (Amsterdam, New York, London: Elsevier Scientific Publishers).

Karl H. Wolf
Emeritus Professor of Geology
Springwood, NSW 2777 Australia